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Hate Speech and the Reasonable 
Supreme Court of Canada 
Mark J. Freiman* 
I. HATE SPEECH AND THE REASONABLE SUPREME  
COURT OF CANADA 
In 1990, in Taylor,1 a case involving allegedly anti-Semitic recorded 
messages, a divided Supreme Court of Canada decided by a majority of 4-3 
that section 13.1 of the Canadian Human Rights Act,2 which prohibits 
“telephonic” communication of messages likely to expose individuals to 
“hatred and contempt” on the basis of a prohibited category of 
discrimination, was constitutionally valid despite its impact on expressive 
freedom. In the fall of 2011, the Supreme Court of Canada heard the 
Whatcott3 case, involving four pamphlets allegedly promoting hatred on the 
basis of sexual orientation. In its decision released in February 2013, a 
unanimous Court revisited the conclusions in Taylor in the context of 
section 14 of the Saskatchewan Human Rights Code,4 reaffirmed the 
constitutionality of anti-hate human rights legislation, but narrowed the 
range for the proper scope for such legislation such that it applies only to 
publication and distribution of material that tends to expose individuals to 
“hatred” rather than “hatred and contempt” on the basis of a prohibited 
ground of discrimination. 
                                                                                                             
*  Mark J. Freiman practices law at Lerners LLP in Toronto. He holds a Ph.D. from 
Stanford University and an LL.B. from the University of Toronto. During the Whatcott proceedings, 
he acted as counsel to one of the interveners supporting the constitutionality of anti-hate legislation. 
1  Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Taylor, [1990] S.C.J. No. 129, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 
892 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Taylor”]. 
2  R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6. 
3  Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v. Whatcott, [2013] S.C.J. No. 11, 276 C.R.R. 
(2d) 270 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Whatcott”]. 
4  S.S. 1979, c. S-24.1. 
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As is often the case with sequels, if you did not like the original, you 
are unlikely to be satisfied with the reprise. Indeed, in some ways, 
Whatcott seems destined to disappoint. Dealing with a topic that often 
elicits passionate rhetoric, the Supreme Court of Canada delivered a 
decision that is short on memorable quotes but long on pragmatism and 
restraint. Although philosophers have weighed in on both sides of the 
debate over hate speech,5 Whatcott is not a philosophic manifesto. The 
pragmatism and compromise that suffuse Whatcott may not endear it to 
those looking for a bold affirmation of philosophic principle or a 
vindication of a particular political theory. Indeed, to some, the 
pragmatism of the Court will appear as a “lost opportunity”,6 as a failure 
to change course and endorse a more absolute view of expressive freedom 
or to conduct a more searching and demanding review of legislation that 
limits this right. That is a political/philosophic criticism, whose validity 
rests on the validity of the assumptions upon which it rests, assumptions 
that at the end of the day may not be capable of proof or disproof because 
they, in turn, depend on values and beliefs that by definition are not 
amenable to proof. Rather than pursue this line of debate, which the Court 
itself does not address, this paper will attempt to deal with the judgment 
in its own terms. From that perspective, the Court’s pragmatism and 
deference do not emerge as political/philosophic failings but rather as a 
consistent and justifiable perspective on the Court’s own role and that of 
other institutions where the issue of regulation of expressive freedom 
arises.7 This approach, which is notable for its ability to attract unanimity 
in an area that had previously fractured the Court, also clarifies the 
Court’s view of the appropriate analytic tools it will bring to bear in the 
exercise of its role in this area. 
                                                                                                             
5  See, e.g., L.W. Sumner, The Hateful and the Obscene (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2004) [hereinafter “Sumner”]; J. Waldron, The Harm in Hate Speech (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2012) [hereinafter “Waldron”]. 
6  See, e.g., the essay by Cara Faith Zwibel in this volume. 
7  The discussion in this paper will focus on expressive freedom under s. 2(b) of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms (see infra, note 8). Although the decision also deals with freedom of 
religion and conscience under s. 2(a) of the Charter, there is little that is new in its treatment of s. 2(a), 
which largely turns on the Court’s observation in Ross v. New Brunswick School District No. 15, [1996] 
S.C.J. No. 40, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 825, at para. 94 (S.C.C.), that “where the manifestations of an individual 
right or freedom are incompatible with the very value sought to be upheld in the process of undertaking 
s. 1 analysis, then an attenuated level of s. 1 justification is appropriate”. The same principle underlines 
the Court’s s. 1 analysis with respect to expressive freedom. 
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1.  Reasonableness 
One potentially helpful way to understand the nature and implica-
tions of the Court’s pragmatic approach is to look at the uses in the 
decision of that quintessentially pragmatic concept, “reasonableness”. 
Reasonableness makes its first appearance in Whatcott in the very first 
paragraph of the decision, which reminds us that all Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms8 guarantees are subject to reasonable limits. The 
issue in Charter litigation is not whether the legislature may limit 
expressive freedom, but rather whether a specific limitation is reasonable. 
That reasonableness is in turn established by means of the familiar Oakes 
test.9 Briefly summarized, in order to qualify as “reasonable,” a limit must: 
(1) address a pressing and substantial objective (i.e., address a real harm); 
(2) be rationally connected to its goal (i.e., be potentially effective); 
(3) minimally impair the Charter right (i.e., not be overbroad in applica-
tion); and 
(4) be proportional in impact (i.e., its benefits must outweigh the social 
costs of limiting the Charter right). 
Although the Court does not undertake its analysis in these explicit 
terms, based on the various objections and challenges raised by 
Mr. Whatcott and the interveners supporting him, the questions the 
Oakes test suggest must be answered with reference to section 14 of the 
Saskatchewan Code include: 
(1) Can speech that falls short of inciting violence be objectively dan-
gerous? (pressing objective) 
(2) Does section 14 identify objectively harmful speech? (effectiveness) 
(3) Is section 14 overbroad, by sweeping in material that is not dangerous 
or that makes a contribution to political and religious debate? (minimal 
impairment) 
(4) Is any benefit from section 14 outweighed by the chilling effect it 
will have on legitimate debate? (proportionality) 
                                                                                                             
8  Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
9  R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.). 
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What is notable about this list of questions is that they depend, to a 
large extent, on issues of what needs to be proved and to what standard: 
(1) What does the state need to prove and by what standard in order to 
establish that hate speech causes harm? 
(2) Can hate speech be consistently and objectively defined and can that 
definition be applied objectively by an adjudicator? 
(3) Can section 14 be applied in a way that does not sweep in types of 
expression that should not be prohibited? 
(4) What does the State have to prove and on what standard, in terms of 
the respective costs and benefits of section 14? 
Reasonableness (or the reasonable person) appears as the appropriate 
definitional standard or jurisprudential test at three important points in 
Whatcott, as part of the Court’s response to questions implicitly raised by 
the Oakes test: 
(1) In the section dealing with the possibility of a definition of the term 
hate, that is neither subjective nor overbroad the touchstone for 
whether a given communication tends to create hate in this redefined 
formulation is the reasonable person. 
(2) In the section dealing with the harm caused by hate speech,10 the 
standard for the legislature to prove such harm is identified as “a 
reasonable apprehension of harm” based on matters familiar to 
Canadians through their everyday knowledge and experience. 
(3) On the issue of “minimal impairment”, the Court affirms that the 
operative question is whether the legislation is within a “range of 
reasonable alternatives available to the legislature.” 
Although, as noted earlier, notions of pragmatism, common sense 
and deference associated with the concept of reasonableness may seem 
out of place in the usually superheated atmosphere that surrounds the 
topic of regulating hate speech, it will be argued that in each instance the 
Court’s recourse to the standard of reasonableness can be seen as a 
principled and appropriate approach to the issue of regulating hate 
                                                                                                             
10  This issue of the nature of the harm in hate speech, or whether hate speech causes any 
harm at all, is central to both Sumner, supra, note 5 and Waldron, supra, note 5. 
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speech and to the proper respective roles of the courts and of the 
legislature in responding to the issue. 
A test based on reasonableness also appears in a fourth location, 
dealing with the appropriate standard for appellate review of Tribunal 
decisions as to whether impugned materials do in fact constitute “hate”. 
The appropriateness of that recourse to a deferential standard of reason-
ableness will be dealt with separately, where it will be suggested that this 
last use of the reasonableness standard, which might otherwise seem an 
unremarkable reference to settled law, is in fact questionable for deci-
sions implicating expressive freedom and one that threatens to 
undermine the integrity of the constitutional analysis in the parts of the 
decision that precede it.  
II. THE MEANING OF “HATE” 
The structure of the judgment in Whatcott has an impact on the 
unfolding of its legal analysis. Because the jurisprudence on expressive 
freedom has established that virtually any expressive act is prima facie 
protected by the section 2(b) Charter guarantee,11 the analysis in an 
expressive freedom case should logically shift immediately to the multi-
stage Oakes test in order to determine whether the specific infringement 
in issue is “demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic society.” 
Whatcott does not follow this template. Instead it begins with a 
preliminary exercise in statutory interpretation, focused on the definition 
of “hate”, which the decision identifies as the key issue in its revisiting of 
the conclusion reached in Taylor. The organizing structure for this 
section consists of a consideration of the definition of hate articulated in 
the majority judgment in Taylor, in light of the criticism of that 
judgment, ostensibly by Mr. Whatcott and the interveners on his side. In 
fact, those criticisms, namely that the definition is “subjective” and 
“overbroad”, are also the criticisms levelled against the majority 
judgment by the dissent in Taylor.12 Either way, they are highly relevant 
                                                                                                             
11  Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 
(S.C.C.). 
12  One way of understanding this unusual structure is as an attempt at a compromise that 
might be a factor in securing a unanimous decision and avoiding the sort of fractures that marked the 
judgments in the 1990 “Hate Speech Trilogy”. In addition to Taylor, the Supreme Court of Canada 
also affirmed, by a majority of 4-3 the constitutionality of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 
provisions dealing with hate speech, in R. v. Keegstra, [1990] S.C.J. No. 131, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 
(S.C.C.) and R. v. Andrews, [1990] S.C.J. No. 130, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 870 (S.C.C.).  
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in resolving the issues of effectiveness, minimal impairment and 
proportionality under the Oakes test. 
1.  Subjectivity and Overbreadth  
In Taylor, Dickson C.J.C., writing for the majority defined “hatred 
and contempt” as “unusually strong and deep felt emotions of detesta-
tion, calumny and vilification”.13 It is this definition that the dissent in 
Taylor criticized as subjective and overbroad. 
In general, an allegation of subjectivity amounts to a criticism that 
the definition of what is being prohibited is too vague and too imprecise 
to allow for a consistent application of the prohibition or to give a person 
fair warning of whether a given action is in fact prohibited. In the result, 
with reference to alleged hate speech, it is stated that the adjudicator 
ends up deciding whether something is “hate” based ultimately on his or 
her subjective views as to what is “hateful” about the content of the 
communication.  
The allegation of overbreadth essentially maintains that a particular 
definition (or, depending on one’s assumptions, any definition) of “hate” 
will inevitably catch communication that deserves to be protected as 
harmless, as a contribution to a legitimate debate, or as an expression of 
personal autonomy.  
Although they are presented — and to some extent discussed — as 
two separate categories, the objections based on subjectivity and on 
overbreadth are clearly linked and are perhaps best understood as aspects 
of the more familiar polemical allegation that the entire project of regu-
lating hate speech amounts to an attempt to censor unpopular ideas.  
The basis of the alleged censorship is said to be in the censor’s (or in 
the state’s) evaluation of the merits of the ideas being expressed, and 
hence the charge of subjectivity. The effect of that exercise is said to be a 
limitation on the range of arguably relevant ideas available to be debated, 
and hence the allegation of overbreadth. In effect, the overbreadth is seen 
as an inevitable result of the alleged inherently subjective nature of the 
assessment. 
Rather than to pursue these allegations through the thickets of political 
and philosophic theory that are their natural habitat, a judgment in 
Whatcott adopts a two-fold approach.  
                                                                                                             
13  Taylor, supra, note 1, at 928.  
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On the one hand, there is a re-examination of the Taylor definition 
itself. The apparent purpose of this re-examination is to ensure that only 
the most extreme forms of expression are captured. On the other hand, 
and much more interestingly, the judgment finesses the entire argument 
by denying its major premise, namely that prohibiting hate speech is an 
exercise of censorship based on content.  
2. Tightening the Definition 
Section 14(b) of the Saskatchewan Human Rights Code ostensibly 
prohibits publication or display of material “that exposes or tends to 
expose to hatred, ridicule or belittles or otherwise affronts the dignity of 
any person or class of persons on the basis of a prohibited ground”.14 
Long before Whatcott, the jurisprudence in Saskatchewan had read 
down this provision to make it applicable only to “hatred and 
contempt”15 as defined in Taylor. Whatcott takes this process one step 
further, effectively deleting “contempt” from a constitutionally valid 
limitation on expressive freedom. Where the Taylor definition 
encompassed “unusually strong and deep felt emotions of detestation, 
calumny and vilification”, Whatcott removes the notion of “calumny”, 
which it finds unnecessary to accomplish legitimate goals of protecting 
vulnerable groups from hate speech. 
The specific theory behind this ruling appears linked to the Court’s 
insistence that the harm in hate speech consists of its effect on third 
parties outside the group being targeted.16 According to the Court, the 
harm in hate speech is that it incites people to hate vulnerable groups. 
The Court appears to be saying that any effect of hate speech on those 
vulnerable groups themselves, especially in terms of any offence they 
may feel, is merely a “derivative effect”.17 On the other hand, it should 
be noted that the Court does cite with apparent approval the statement by 
Dickson C.J.C. in Keegstra that among the damaging consequences of 
hate propaganda are the “grave psychological and social consequences to 
                                                                                                             
14  Saskatchewan Human Rights Code, supra, note 4. 
15  The term “contempt” does not appear in the Saskatchewan legislation. It had, before 
Whatcott, been included in what was prohibited by virtue of the Taylor standard, which specifies 
“hatred and contempt”.  
16  Whatcott, supra, note 3, para. 42. 
17  Id., at para. 82. 
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individual members of the targeted group from the humiliation and 
degradation” caused by hate speech.18  
Be all that as it may, the practical effect of tightening the definition 
of “hate” by excluding the effects of the communication on its targets 
and by restricting its ambit to producing extreme emotions of detestation 
and vilification beyond mere “contempt” is clear. The narrower the 
definition of hate, the less chance that it will sweep in communications 
that should be protected and thus the less chance that the application of 
the definition will be overbroad. 
3.  Focus on “Effect” Rather Than on “Content” 
The more noteworthy response to objections of subjectivity and 
overbreadth in Whatcott, is its treatment of the implicit allegation of 
censorship based on content. The response is simply to deny the 
allegation:  
A separate … conceptual challenge that impedes the proper 
application of hate speech prohibitions is a mistaken propensity to 
focus on the nature of the ideas expressed, rather than on the likely 
effects of the expression. The repugnant content of expression may 
sidetrack litigants from the proper focus of the analysis. 
… A blanket prohibition on the communication of repugnant ideas 
would offend the core of freedom of expression and could not be 
viewed as a minimal impairment of that right. 
The distinction between the expression of repugnant ideas and 
expression which exposes groups to hatred is crucial to understanding 
the proper application of hate speech prohibitions. Hate speech 
legislation is not aimed at discouraging repugnant or offensive ideas. It 
does not, for example, prohibit expression which debates the merits of 
reducing the rights of vulnerable groups in society. It only restricts the 
use of expression exposing them to hatred as a part of that debate. It 
does not target the ideas, but their mode of expression in public and the 
effect that this mode of expression may have.19 
This passage is intended to focus analytic attention away from the 
intellectual merits or demerits of the ideas and onto the effect of hate 
                                                                                                             
18  Id., at para. 73. 
19  Id., at paras. 49-51. 
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speech and then to identify the manner of expression as the means by 
which this effect is produced. 
This formulation is to some extent no doubt an invocation of the 
familiar concept that human rights legislation is concerned with effects 
rather than with intentions,20 but there is much more to this point. The 
effect in this case is the production of hatred. It is not the transmission of 
offensive or prohibited ideas. Crucially, the way that hatred is produced 
is through the mode and manner in which the communication is 
transmitted, rather than simply its intellectual content. 
This notion of focusing on the mode of expression and the effects of 
that mode in producing hatred, rather than on the ideas being communi-
cated, echoes Waldron’s observation that much hate speech regulation 
“permits the racist [the homophobe] and the Islamophobe to speak, to 
mount challenges they want to mount: they just have to take care with 
the mode and manner in which their challenge is captured”.21  
Waldron’s point and the point in Whatcott is not to call for good 
manners in political argument. It is to draw attention to the fact that hate 
is not simply produced by ideas but also by the manner in which any 
such ideas are communicated. 
Another possible way of understanding this concept, though not one 
pursued in the judgment itself, is perhaps to focus on the notion of affect 
in addition to effect. 
Communication takes place on many levels. While almost any 
communication can probably be broken down into a logical syllogism 
(whether valid or not) much of our expressive — and persuasive — 
activity takes place at the level of emotion. Persuasive meaning is usually 
produced not solely, or even primarily, on the basis of intellectual content, 
but also by an appeal to emotion. To cite a homely analogy, if the goal is to 
evoke revolutionary ardour, having members of an audience listen to a 
four-hour speech detailing the deficiencies of the status quo is likely to be 
less effective than having them hear — or even better, having them sing — 
the Marseillaise, whose persuasive force has little to do with the 
intellectual content of its lyrics.  
Hate is an emotion, not an idea. The right to be free from hatred 
intersects with the right to be protected from discrimination. As set out 
among other places in article 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
                                                                                                             
20  Ontario (Human Rights Commission) v. Simpsons-Sears, [1985] S.C.J. No. 74, [1985] 
2 S.C.R. 536 (S.C.C.). 
21  Waldron, supra, note 5, at 199. 
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Rights, it is a right to be “free from discrimination and from incitement to 
discrimination”.22 The mode of this incitement is the creation of hate. 
While a broad range, especially of political expression, may contain both 
intellectual and emotive content, what separates hate speech from other 
types of political communication, is that it is pitched to an emotion that is 
intrinsically dangerous. 
4.  The Reasonable Person  
The idea that the focus of anti-hate legislation is on its incitement of 
discrimination through the creation of the objectively dangerous emotion 
of hate, brings the argument back to the notion of subjectivity and its 
corollary of overbreadth. 
If what is being prohibited is not the communication of ideas but the 
incitement of hatred, then the test for what constitutes such incitement 
cannot be based simply on the intellectual content of that communica-
tion. It must focus instead on the affect that the communication produces. 
Does the fact that this affect — the emotion of hatred — is, like all 
emotions, inherently subjective in the way it is experienced, mean that a 
definition that focuses on the production of this affect is also inherently 
subjective? The response in Whatcott involves invoking the notion of 
reasonableness in the form of the reasonable person test as the objective 
standard for assessing whether a given communication has as its 
probable effect the incitement of the emotion of hatred.23 Saying that a 
“reasonable person” (a concept that includes the notion of a person aware 
of the relevant cultural and historic context) is able to identify 
communications that are likely to expose their targets to detestation and 
vilification may indeed resemble the observation articulated by Justice 
Potter Stewart, that despite the difficulties in defining hard core 
pornography, “I know it when I see it.”24 In this case, the observation 
may be totally accurate. The stirring up of the extreme emotion of hatred 
involves considerations of mode and manner that may be easier to 
decode than to define.  
                                                                                                             
22  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217 (III), UN GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. 
No. 13, UN Doc. A/810 (1948). 
23  Whatcott, supra, note 3, at para. 52. 
24  Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964). 
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III. THE “HARM IN HATE SPEECH” 
Having narrowed the definition of hate to remove notions of  
contempt, calumny, offensiveness and assaults on dignity, Whatcott then 
turns to a more structured consideration of the constitutionality of this 
modified definition through the lens of the Oakes test. Here too, reason-
ableness as the appropriate standard or test plays an important role. 
Reasonableness is central to the Court’s analysis of the harm in hate 
speech. Specifying the harm in hate speech is clearly relevant to several 
steps in the Oakes test. From the initial step of assessing whether the 
“harm” that the legislation is aimed at countering is a pressing and sub-
stantial one, through consideration of whether the means chosen are 
effective in countering the harm, down to a balancing of whether the 
benefits achieved in responding to the harm are capable of justifying the 
corresponding limitation that the means chosen impose on the constitu-
tional right, it is necessary to be able to specify precisely what, if 
anything, is the harm produced by hate speech.  
1.  Proof of Harm 
The answer to the crucial question of what sort of “harm” is necessary 
to justify an infringement on individual liberties depends largely on the 
assumptions one brings to the table, notably how one defines the 
seemingly straightforward concept of harm. If one adopts the “harm 
principle” as articulated by John Stuart Mill in his famous essay 
On Liberty, then hate speech falling short of incitement to violence will be 
seen as causing no “harm” capable of justifying a limitation on the 
expressive freedom.25 On the other hand, if one assumes that all members 
of society have an inherent right to human dignity, equal treatment and 
social inclusion or if one assumes that hate speech has effects on members 
of the targeted group that can be analogized to the effects of defamation, 
then the delegitimating effects of hate speech will be seen as clear 
instances of harm capable of justifying the limitation of such speech.26 
The Court did dip its metaphorical toe into these philosophic waters in 
R. v. Malmo-Levine,27 appearing to reject the proposition that the “harm 
principle” as articulated by John Stuart Mill (and adopted by many critics 
                                                                                                             
25  Sumner, supra, note 5. 
26  Waldron, supra, note 5. 
27  [2003] S.C.J. No. 79, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571 (S.C.C.).  
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of anti-hate legislation) is a proper yardstick for assessing constitutionality, 
but does not take up the opportunity to extend the discussion in the present 
case. It does, however, consider the issue of the proof of such harm. 
Given that the issue of what, if anything, constitutes the harm in hate 
speech appears to rest on philosophical assumptions that are difficult, if 
not impossible, to test empirically, the question of what, if anything, 
needs to be proved in order to demonstrate a harm sufficient to justify 
limiting expressive freedom and on what basis that proof may be made, 
becomes central to the whole section 1 analysis. One of the central 
aspects of the critique of anti-hate legislation on the basis of overbreadth 
is the assertion that in the absence of proof of objective harm, such 
legislation is inherently overbroad since the demonstrable damage to 
expressive freedom cannot be balanced against a mere risk of harm.28 
The Court’s response does not step back to consider philosophic first 
principles, but rather relies on common sense. Citing Thomson Newspa-
pers Co.,29 the Court rejects any requirement for scientific proof as 
unrealistic. Instead, it reaffirms a “reasonable apprehension of harm” test 
as the appropriate standard in cases where “it has been suggested though 
not proven that the very nature of the expression in question undermines 
the position of groups or individuals as equal participants in society”.30  
The Court then sets out with approval, Thomson’s vindication of 
common sense as central to section 1 considerations: 
While courts should not use common sense as a cover for unfounded or 
controversial assumptions, it may be appropriately employed in judicial 
reasoning where the possibility of harm is within the everyday 
knowledge and experience of Canadians, or where factual 
determination and value judgments overlap. Canadians presume that 
expressions which degrade individuals based on their gender, ethnicity, 
or other personal factors may lead to harm being visited upon them 
because this is within most people’s everyday experience ... Common 
sense reflects common understandings. In these cases dealing with 
pornography and hate speech, common understandings were accepted 
by the Court because they are widely accepted by Canadians as facts, 
                                                                                                             
28  R. Moon, The Constitutional Protection of Freedom of Expression (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 2000), at 37 [hereinafter “Moon”]. 
29  Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1998] S.C.J. No. 44, [1998] 
1 S.C.R. 877 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Thomson”]. 
30  Id., at para. 115. 
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and because they are integrally related to our values, which are the 
bedrock of any s. 1 justification.31 
Common sense here plays much the same role as the reasonable 
person test played in identifying whether a given communication had the 
effect of producing hate. Rather than debate philosophic first principles, 
the Court simply refers to the majority judgment in Taylor, to conclude 
that the “societal impact” of hate propaganda consists of its effect of 
“laying the groundwork for later, broad attacks on vulnerable groups” 
ranging from discrimination, to ostracism, deportation, violence and, in 
the most extreme cases, genocide.32 As for the question of the proof of 
such harm, the Court simply notes that these effects “are part of the 
everyday knowledge and experience of Canadians”.33 As a consequence 
the Court reaffirms that the legislature is entitled to enact anti-hate 
speech legislation based on a “reasonable apprehension of harm”. 
Given the potentially calamitous consequences, the decision appears 
to be saying that it is unreasonable to await objective confirmation that 
the “groundwork” being laid has had its anticipated results.  
As with the reasonable person test for whether the effect of a 
communication is to produce hate, this reliance on the common sense 
conclusion that hatred has discriminatory effects as sufficient proof of the 
harm in hate speech will not likely satisfy critics of the decision, but the 
Court is surely correct in recognizing that in this instance as well empirical 
proof is impossible. The demand for such proof is tantamount to pre-
ordaining a finding of unconstitutionality and, contrary to the Court’s 
existing jurisprudence, to making the guarantee of expressive freedom 
virtually absolute. 
2.  A Range of Reasonable Alternatives Available to the Legislature 
The Court recognizes that the effect of the “reasonable apprehension 
of harm” test is to afford the legislature a “margin of appreciation” in 
deciding its legislative objectives.34 It also recognizes that the deference 
implicit in this approach has been the subject of criticism.35 
                                                                                                             
31  Whatcott, supra, note 3, at para. 133, citing Thomson, id., at para. 116. 
32  Whatcott, id., at para. 74. 
33  Id., para. 135. 
34  Id., at para. 134. 
35  Id., at para. 130. 
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A similar margin of appreciation is afforded in the Court’s overall 
consideration of the “minimal impairment” step of the Oakes test. Here, 
too, the criterion invoked is reasonableness. In assessing, as required by 
the Oakes test, whether the legislative approach adopted represents a 
minimal impairment of expressive freedom, the Court rejects the idea 
that a measure does not minimally impair expressive freedom because it 
may “be possible to imagine a solution that impairs the right at stake less 
than the solution Parliament has adopted”.36 Instead, the Court insists 
that, “[p]rovided the option chosen is one within a range of reasonable 
supportable alternatives, the minimal impairment test will be met”.37  
Here too, it is to be expected that the Court will also be criticized for 
being overly deferential to the legislature, especially, in this case, in light 
of the breadth of the range of “reasonable alternatives” that the Court 
acknowledges.38 
Mr. Whatcott and the interveners who supported him had argued that 
whatever harms there were in hate speech, they could be adequately 
countered by other means that did not infringe as seriously, or at all, on 
expressive freedom. They maintained that on this basis the solution 
adopted in the Saskatchewan Human Rights Code could not pass the 
minimal impairment test. Among the suggestions made were that the 
harms of hate speech could be properly regulated through the “Hate 
Propaganda” sections of the Criminal Code,39 which they argued contain 
better protections for expressive freedom by requiring, among other 
things, proof of intent, and by providing for defences such as 
truthfulness. Others argued that the legislative regulation of hate speech 
is inherently ineffective and counterproductive since ideas cannot be 
defeated by suppressing them. On that basis, they argued that the 
“marketplace of ideas” (i.e., free and unfettered debate) was not only the 
best protection for expressive freedom, but also the best mechanism for 
defeating “bad ideas”. 
Each of these suggestions is not without issues.  
The Criminal Code provisions are focused on the person 
communicating the message and on punishment of those actions. They 
are not primarily focused on the messages themselves and on their 
                                                                                                             
36  Id., at para. 101, citing Canada (Attorney General) v. JTI-Macdonald Corp., [2007] 
S.C.J. No. 30, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 610 (S.C.C.). 
37  Whatcott, id., at para. 101. 
38  See, e.g., Moon, supra, note 28, at 37, which criticizes the Hate Speech Trilogy on 
precisely this basis. 
39  R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
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discriminatory, or worse, social consequences. While the burden of 
proof, the standard of proof and the need to prove intent are all 
appropriate in a Criminal Code context, different considerations apply 
when the goal is combating the consequences of hate through non-penal 
means. The requirement of proof of intent, alone, would defeat the focus 
on the effects of discrimination. 
As for the marketplace of ideas, it is questionable whether the 
analogy to classical 19th-century liberal economic theory is at all an apt 
one, or indeed whether that theory, which opposes any form of regulation 
beyond the “invisible hand of the market” retains even much persuasive 
force in the context of the current far from unregulated economy. If there 
is any parallel with the marketplace for goods, then it will also be 
necessary to recognize the existence of “market failure” in the 
intellectual marketplace. Even if it could be stated that in the long run 
“good” ideas prevail over “bad” ideas through intellectual competition, it 
would be important to note that such consequences would be no more 
simultaneous than they are in the economic marketplace. Just as in the 
economic marketplace bankruptcies and cyclical depressions are the 
regulators where no other regulators exist, so in the marketplace of ideas 
“bad ideas” like slavery, anti-Semitism, homophobia and xenophobia 
have taken a distressingly long time and have inflicted severe suffering 
on the way to being eventually defeated by “good ideas”, with the 
process still far from complete. 
Although the Court briefly notes the fact that the effectiveness of the 
proposed “less restrictive alternatives” is capable of being questioned, it 
ends by concluding that each of them is also a “reasonable” approach to 
regulating hate speech. Notably, however, even though regulation subject 
to more safeguards or even no regulation at all are both deemed reason-
able alternatives, that does not render anti-hate speech legislation, such 
as section 14 of the Saskatchewan Human Rights Code, unconstitutional 
by virtue of its greater incursion on expression freedom. 
This is clearly a very deferential approach to an area of legislative 
initiative which in the U.S. constitutional jurisprudence is subject to the 
strictest of scrutiny.  
On the other hand, such deference is also capable of justification. 
The conclusion that even after one has defined “hate” in an appropriately 
narrow fashion, there is a very broad range of reasonable responses that a 
legislature could take to dealing with hate speech, at the end of the day 
amounts to a conclusion that the issue is fundamentally a political one. 
Different potential resolutions that may be proposed will inevitably 
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reflect the values and assumptions of those who propose them. The 
ardour of the views held by proponents of one side or another in the 
debate and the sincerity of their belief as to the danger in respectively 
regulating or not regulating hate speech, are just as reasonably seen as 
support for the appropriateness of the Court’s approach as they are as a 
basis for criticism. Where a number of views are plausible and none is 
unconstitutional, the Court’s proper role arguably does not extend to 
deciding which of these views is the wisest. Indeed, the political process, 
which includes the continuous possibility of repeal or re-enactment, may 
justifiably be seen as an appropriate safety valve for a resolution of the 
competing moral and philosophic assumptions in issue. 
IV. REVIEW ON THE BASIS OF REASONABLENESS 
The final area in which the Court invokes the notion of reasonableness 
as a standard or test is in the area of implementation, specifically on the 
issue of the standard of review for tribunal decisions on the substantive 
question of whether given communications actually do constitute hate 
speech.  
In this area, the reliance on reasonableness is potentially more trou-
bling and less defensible than are the Court’s previous invocations of 
variants of that notion. 
Although the Court does not appear to recognize the potential prob-
lem, the issue is once again subjectivity. The diversity of the conclusions 
by the Tribunal, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada 
does not in itself necessarily raise this issue. 
The Tribunal at first instance found that all four pamphlets infringed 
the Saskatchewan Human Rights Code’s prohibition of hate speech. The 
Court of Appeal found that none of the four violated section 14 because 
it viewed them as contributions to a political/religious debate. The 
Supreme Court of Canada decision concluded that two of the pamphlets 
violated section 14 and two did not. On an analytic basis, the final 
outcome in the Supreme Court of Canada can easily be justified as an 
implementation of the modified definition set out earlier in the decision. 
From that perspective, the Tribunal decision can be seen as faulty 
because it adopted too lax a definition of hate, while the decisions in the 
Court of Appeal were faulty because they incorrectly focused on the 
pamphlets as “ideas” rather than on their effect in creating hate. 
The discussion, however, should not end there. 
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As part of its review of the decisions below, the Court deals with the 
standard of review applicable to such a review. In line with the current 
human rights jurisprudence, the Court finds that the issue of 
constitutionality, being a question of law outside the expertise of the 
Tribunal, must be decided on the basis of standard of correctness. However, 
on the substantive issue of whether, on the basis of a constitutionally correct 
definition of hate, the pamphlets in question did violate section 14, the 
Court found that proper standard of review was the deferential standard of 
“reasonableness”.40  
This may be one bridge to reasonableness too far.  
In order for a standard of deference to apply to a decision and for the 
question to be, not whether the decision is correct but whether it is 
“reasonable”, it must be possible to imagine more than one “reasonable” 
conclusion capable of being reached on the facts in issue. It must be 
possible — to adopt the formulation in the leading case of Dunsmuir41 — 
to conceive of a “reasonable range of acceptable conclusions” as to 
whether section 14 of the Saskatchewan Human Rights Code has been 
violated by a specific communication. It is difficult to see how there 
could be such a range. If there were a range of reasonable responses, then 
the reasonable person test would not be an objective one, but a subjective 
one based on the specific and individual views of the decision-maker. 
The criticism of subjectivity would consequently be made out.  
It would accordingly appear that only one possible reasonable con-
clusion is possible in any given case and that, notwithstanding Dunsmuir, 
only a standard of review of correctness is justifiable. 
In this connection, it is notable that one of the protections for 
expressive freedoms with regard to section 14 that the Court in Whatcott 
cites with approval is the fact that the Saskatchewan legislature has 
moved the adjudication of section 14 complaints away from lay Tribunal 
members and entrusted it to the judiciary. The standard of review 
applicable to judges in a court of law is correctness. It would be ironic if 
the consequence of having hate speech complaints adjudicated by an 
administrative Tribunal would be to lower the standard of review. 
The Court dismisses with little comment the submissions advanced by 
Mr. Whatcott and some of the interveners that supported him that the 
                                                                                                             
40  Whatcott, supra, note 3, at para. 167. 
41  Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, [2008] S.C.J. No. 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 (S.C.C.). 
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process and procedures of Human Rights Tribunals are inapt for decisions 
about hate speech.42 
In light of the apparent incongruity of applying the Dunsmuir 
standard of review to decisions about hate speech, it is perhaps to be 
hoped that any legislature considering whether to enact, modify or repeal 
anti-hate legislation will take a closer look, not only at the importance of 
specifying correctness as the applicable standard for appellate review, but 
also at the issue of the suitability of a wider range of the usual 
administrative law processes and procedures to such adjudication, in order 
to ensure fairness in the handling of this delicate and constitutionally 
sensitive area. 
                                                                                                             
42  Whatcott, supra, note 3, at para. 168. 
